The State of Texas unsuccessfully sought preclearance approval under the Voting Rights Act of its 2011 voter photo ID law (SB 14).  A three-judge court in Washington DC denied preclearance approval because it found the law to be discriminatory.  Following its decision in Shelby County v. Holder declaring the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional, the Court vacated the judgment of the DC Court.

In 2007, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that BCRA’s prohibition on corporate electioneering communications—defined as broadcast ads within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election that named a candidate and were targeted at the relevant voters—was unconstitutional as applied to ads that did not constitute express advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate or its functional equivalent. However, the Court did not find the same “express advocacy” limitation applied to BCRA’s disclosure requirements for electioneering communications. 

The CLC was part of the legal team representing Amici Curiae Senator John McCain, Representative Christopher Shays and Representative Martin Meehan in support of the FEC.

In January 2004, the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS) and others filed a constitutional challenge to several aspects of Arizona’s public campaign financing system. The district court dismissed the challenge, and plaintiffs appealed.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed the lower court, dismissing the entire case as moot on May 10, 2007. Upon plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, however, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, determined that some of the claims were not moot, and remanded the case to the district court to permit further development of these claims. Plaintiffs eventually voluntarily dismissed their case, with similar issues being litigated in McComish v. Bennett.

In Valdes v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the conviction of a police officer under the federal gratuities statute accepting cash from an undercover FBI agent in exchange for searching law enforcement databases for information.  The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction, finding that the police officer’s action did not rise to the level of an “official act” as required by federal law because his use of the database was not part of a pending police matter and not part of his assigned official duties.  It construed the term “official act” to include only those formal, official actions that are connected to a “class of questions or matters whose answer or disposition is determined by the government,” thereby greatly narrowing the scope and effectiveness of the federal prohibition on gratuities.

In 2006, the Christian Civic League challenged the constitutionality of BCRA’s electioneering communications provision as applied to advertisement CCL alleged it wished to broadcast naming a candidate during the period before the election. A three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit as moot.  In 2007, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court “for further consideration in light of Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.”

The CLC served as co-counsel to the defendant-intervenors.

Illinois’ highest court selects its judges through partisan elections. This case reached that court in 2002 following a $1.05 billion verdict against State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Company. While the case was pending, a new judge was elected to the Illinois Supreme Court, who received more than $1 million in direct and indirect campaign contributions from  State Farm and groups affiliated with State Farm.  The judge refused to disqualify himself and then cast the deciding vote in favor of State Farm overturning the verdict.  The petition for certiorari raised the question whether a judge receiving such financial support from a party and its supporters, while that party’s case is pending before him, may cast the deciding vote in that case consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In 1999, the Vermont Republican State Committee and other plaintiffs filed a federal district court constitutional challenge to various provisions of Vermont state campaign finance law, including the state’s contribution and expenditure limits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on the questions of whether Vermont’s candidate expenditure limits contribution limits ranging from $200-$400 per candidate violate the First Amendment. The Court struck down both the expenditure limits and the contributions limits. With respect to the expenditure limits, the Court relied on its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo striking down federal expenditure limits on First Amendment grounds. With respect to the contribution limits, the Court noted many differences between Vermont’s limits and the federal and state contribution limits the Court had upheld in earlier decisions against constitutional challenge. The Court found Vermont’s limits to be much lower and more restrictive than the constitutionally permissible contribution limits at the federal level and in other states. Although the Court invalidated Vermont’s contribution limits, the Court’s decision left in force federal limits and limits in other states.