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In response to a complaint filed with the FEC concerning the personal use of a leased vehicle financed with campaign funds.
The panel affirmed in part the district court’s summary judgment and dismissed in part the appeal as non-justiciable in an action challenging California’s Political Reform Act of 1974, which requires political committees to report certain information about their contributors to the State, specifically, semi-annual disclosures identifying those individuals who have contributed more than $100 during or after a campaign, in addition to each contributor’s address, occupation and employer.
The brief examines whether the district court erred in holding that the Delaware Elections Disclosure Act was likely unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff-Appellee Delaware Strong Families’ General Election Values Voter Guide because the Voter Guide is a “presumably neutral” communication published by a “presumably neutral” organization “by reason of [Delaware Strong Families’] 501(c)(3) status.” Also, Whether the district court erred in holding that Appellee Delaware Strong Families established the non-merits factors required for issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff Democratic Governors Association (“DGA”) has moved to preliminarily enjoin the operation of sections 9-601b(a)(2) and 9-601c(c) of the Connecticut General Statutes. Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 10). Defendants Michael J. Brandi, Anthony J. Castagno, Salvatore Bramante, Patricia Stanekevicius, Stephen Penny, and Michael J. Ajello, all in their official capacities as officials of Connecticut’s State Elections Enforcement Commission (“SEEC”); George Jepsen, in his official capacity as Connecticut Attorney General; and Kevin T. Kane, in his official capacity as Connecticut’s Chief State’s Attorney, oppose the Motion, and have moved to dismiss DGA’s Complaint.1 Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Defs.’ Opp.”) (Doc. No. 28); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) (Doc. No. 27). For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and the Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Plaintiff hereby gives notice that the above-captioned action is voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, against all of the named Defendants.
Our organizations strongly support the DISCLOSE Act of 2014 introduced today by Senator Whitehouse (D-RI) with 49 cosponsors. Our organizations include Americans for Campaign Reform, the Brennan Center for Justice, the Campaign Legal Center, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Common Cause, Democracy 21, Demos, the League of Women Voters, People For the American Way, Public Citizen and Sunlight Foundation. The legislation would ensure that voters know the identity of donors who have been secretly financing campaign expenditures in federal elections. Voters have a fundamental right to know this information.
Plaintiffs, a non‐profit corporation and a Vermont political committee, appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (William K. Sessions, III, Judge) granting summary judgment to Defendants, Vermont officials charged with enforcing Vermont elections statutes. The non‐profit corporation asserts that statutory provisions requiring identification of the speaker on any “electioneering communication,” requiring reporting of certain “mass media activities,” and defining and requiring reporting by “political committees” are void for vagueness and violate the First Amendment facially and as applied. The Vermont political committee brings an as‐applied challenge against a provision limiting contributions to political committees. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Motion of the FEC to dismiss or affirm. The question presented is whether the three-judge district court correctly held that the “soft money” provisions of Section 101 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 82, are constitutional as applied to the Republican National Committee, its Chairman, and its state and local affiliates. Appellee argues that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. In the alternative, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Plaintiff-Appellees brief for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs ask that the Court reverse the district court, finding the district court’s denial of the Coalition’s preliminary injunction request of the contribution window and the entity contribution ban to be an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs also argue that the Court should remand those issues with instructions to enter preliminary injunction for the Coalition. Also, the Court should affirm the district court’s grant of the Coalition’s preliminary injunction request as to the party contribution ban and the IE source ban.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief. Plaintiff Shelby County requests that the Court declare Section 4(b) and Section 5 of the VRA unconstitutional; issue a permanent injunction against Defendant Attorney General Eric Holder, enjoining the enforcement of Section 4(b) and Section 5 of the VRA; award Plaintiff its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for bringing this action; and order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Appellant-Plaintiff RNC’s jurisdictional statement. The question presented is whether the prohibition on political parties’ solicitation and expenditure of “nonfederal money” imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 is unconstitutional as applied to political activities that, when funded by nonfederal money, do not create a risk of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption of federal officeholders. Appellant argues that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
Appellant’s/Cross-Appellee’s principal brief. Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction allowing unlimited contributions from individuals and nonindividual entities to independent expenditure committees in City candidate elections. Also, that the court further abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction requiring the City to allow political parties to make direct contributions to candidates. Thus, the court should reverse the district court on these two aspects of its preliminary injunction orders.
Decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court concludes that the contribution limits set forth in certified questions 1, 2, and 3 cannot be constitutionally applied against SpeechNow and the individual plaintiffs. The Court further concludes that there is no constitutional infirmity in theapplication of the organizational, administrative, and reporting requirements set forth in certified questions 4 and 5. The Court also concludes that because of the decision made, as guided by Citizens United, which intervened since the entry of the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ petition for injunctive relief, the district court’s order denying injunctive relief is vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the decision.
Memorandum opinion of the three-judge district court panel. The FEC's motion for summary judgment is granted, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied, and the FEC's motion to dismiss is dismissed as moot.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cao. Plaintiffs-Appellants request that the Court find the Party Expenditure Provision limits unconstitutional as applied to RNC’s “own speech,” and find that the $5,000 contribution limit is unconstitutional in that it imposes the same limits on political parties as on PACs and is not adjusted for inflation. Plaintiffs-Appellants also request that the Court consider the non-certified questions on the merits and find that the Party Expenditure Provision limits and Coordination-Contribution Provision are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and that the $5,000 contribution limit at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A), standing alone, is unconstitutionally low.
Memorandum of points and authorities in support of the City of San Diego's Motion for Immediate Stay of enforcement of portions of the Court's February 16, 2010 order and the Court's February 19, 2010 order. The City request that the Court grant an immediate stay as to those portions of the Court's order relating to contributions to independent expenditure committees; and that the Court issue a stay to remain in effect pending resolution of the appeals in the case. Alternatively, the City requests that the Court issue a stay to remain in effect unit the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may rule upon an application for a stay pending appeal addressed to that Court.
Defendants file this brief and ask the Court to dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the following grounds: (1) the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the Court from issuing declaratory or injunctive relief against a State when the relief operates only retrospectively, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1982); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and (2) Plaintiff’s claims for relief are moot because there is no longer any live dispute between the parties.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's decision. Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge Williams. The judgment of the district court is reversed.