

BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
ROGER G. WIEAND
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005

v. MUR No. _____

BRANDON HERRERA,
BRANDON HERRERA FOR CONGRESS
and THOMAS DATWYLER in his official
capacity as treasurer
11844 Bandera Road #499
Helotes, TX 78023

BECAUSE REAL AMERICANS NEVER DOUBT
OUR NATION and THOMAS DATWYLER in his
official capacity as treasurer
502 6th Street
Hudson, WI 54016

BRANDON HERRERA VICTORY COMMITTEE
and THOMAS DATWYLER in his official capacity
as treasurer
PO Box 183
Hudson, WI 54016

COMPLAINT

1. Brandon Herrera, a congressional candidate in Texas’s 23rd congressional district, has reportedly paid a whopping 99.4% of his 2026 campaign’s expenditures—totaling over \$1.2 million—to a single recipient, Texas Strategy Group (“TSG”). When Herrera unsuccessfully sought the same office in 2024, his campaign similarly reported paying TSG for the vast majority of the campaign’s expenses—over \$1.5 million, representing roughly 92% of its operating expenses during that election cycle. His leadership PAC and joint fundraising committee have also reported paying TSG for the vast majority of their operating expenses. But there is no indication that TSG provides any of the campaign services for which Herrera’s committees have paid it over \$2.7 million (and counting)

over the past three years. On the contrary, available evidence strongly suggests that TSG is actually an integrated arm of the Herrera political operation rather than a bona fide, independent commercial entity, and that its sole purpose is to allow Herrera’s political committees to conceal the true recipients of their election spending.

2. This opaque reporting structure blatantly violates the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or the “Act”), which requires all political committees to report the actual recipients of their payments. By obscuring that information, Herrera and his committees have unlawfully denied voters critical transparency about their spending.
3. This complaint is filed pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) and is based on information and belief that Brandon Herrera, Brandon Herrera for Congress, Because Real Americans Never Doubt Our Nation (“BRANDON PAC”), Brandon Herrera Victory Committee, and Thomas Datwyler in his official capacity as treasurer for all three of these political committees, have violated FECA, 52 U.S.C. § 30101, *et seq.*¹

FACTS

4. Brandon Herrera is running in the 2026 midterm election to represent Texas’s 23rd congressional district.² His principal campaign committee is Brandon Herrera for Congress and Thomas Datwyler in his official capacity as treasurer.³ He previously ran for the same office during the 2024 election cycle, using the same committee.⁴

¹ See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2); *see also* 11 C.F.R. § 111.4(a).

² Brandon Herrera, Amend. Statement of Candidacy (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/523/202508169789487523/202508169789487523.pdf>.

³ Brandon Herrera for Congress, Statement of Org. at 1 (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/519/202508169789487519/202508169789487519.pdf>.

⁴ See Brandon Herrera, Statement of Candidacy (July 3, 2023), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/158/202307039582429158/202307039582429158.pdf>.

5. Because Real Americans Never Doubt Our Nation (“BRANDON PAC”) is a leadership PAC sponsored by Herrera, and Datwyler is its treasurer.⁵
6. Brandon Herrera Victory Committee (“BHVC”) is a joint fundraising committee that raises funds for Herrera’s campaign and leadership PAC, and Datwyler is also its treasurer.⁶
7. During the 2025-2026 election cycle to date, Herrera’s campaign has reported paying TSG a total of \$1,217,247,⁷ which represents an incredible 99.4% of the campaign’s total expenditures (\$1,222,958.29).⁸
8. Herrera’s campaign has paid TSG for a wide variety of services, including “media placement,” “campaign consulting,” “printing,” (these three categories represent the vast majority of the reported amount disbursed), as well as compliance, caging, bank fees and “database.”⁹ A table summarizing the payments appears below.

⁵ Because Real Americans Never Doubt Our Nation, Statement of Org. at 2, 6 (Aug. 21, 2025), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/146/202508219789794146/202508219789794146.pdf>.

⁶ Brandon Herrera Victory Committee, Amend. Statement of Org. at 2 (Nov. 25, 2025), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/271/202511259793331271/202511259793331271.pdf>.

⁷ See *Brandon Herrera for Congress, Disbursements (2025-2026): Texas Strategy Group*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00844324&recipient_name=texas+strategy+group&two_year_transaction_period=2026 (last visited May 14, 2026).

⁸ See *Brandon Herrera for Congress, Disbursements (2025-2026)*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee_id=C00844324&two_year_transaction_period=2026&data_type=processed (last visited May 14, 2026) (toggling to the “raw” data view displays expenditures from the campaign’s most recent report).

⁹ See *Brandon Herrera for Congress, Disbursements (2025-2026): Texas Strategy Group*, *supra* note 7.

Herrera Campaign’s Reported Disbursements to Texas Strategy Group, 2025-2026

Disbursement Description	Amount
Printing	\$36,393.68
Media Placement	\$682,000.00
Database	\$5,100.00
Compliance Consulting	\$3,275.00
Campaign Consulting	\$490,360.00
Caging	\$113.75
Bank Fees	\$5.00
Grand Total	\$1,217,247.43

9. During the 2024 election cycle, Herrera’s campaign similarly reported paying TSG an overwhelming share of its operating expenditures (excluding transfers and contributions to other committees, as well as contribution refunds): Per its disclosure reports, it paid TSG \$1,522,500, which represents about 92% of the campaign’s operating expenses for the 2024 cycle.¹⁰

10. The only federal committees that have ever reported paying TSG are Herrera-affiliated committees.¹¹ In addition to Herrera’s campaign, TSG has reportedly received payments from Herrera’s leadership PACs—the now-defunct “BASED PAC”¹² and the active BRANDON PAC—as well as BHVC, the joint fundraising committee.¹³ BRANDON PAC has paid 93% of its disbursements to TSG,¹⁴ and BHVC—after excluding transfers

¹⁰ See *Brandon Herrera for Congress Disbursements (2023-2024): Texas Strategy Group*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00844324&recipient_name=texas+strategy+group&two_year_transaction_period=2024 (last visited May 19, 2026); *Brandon Herrera for Congress Financial Summary (2023-2024)*, FEC, <https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00844324/?cycle=2024> (last visited May 19, 2026).

¹¹ See *Disbursements (Texas Strategy Group)*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&recipient_name=texas+strategy+group&max_date=12%2F31%2F2026 (last visited May 14, 2026).

¹² See BASED PAC, Amend. Statement of Org. at 2, 5 (Sept. 18, 2024), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/462/202409189675522462/202409189675522462.pdf>.

¹³ See *Disbursements (Texas Strategy Group)*, *supra* note 11.

¹⁴ See *Because Real Americans Never Doubt Our Nation, Disbursements: Texas Strategy Group*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00916825&recipient_name=texas

of fundraising proceeds to the joint fundraising participants (Herrera’s campaign and leadership PAC)—has provided about 88% of its spending (over \$1.2 million) to TSG.¹⁵

11. In addition to the media placement and campaign consulting services TSG reportedly provided to Herrera’s campaign, BRANDON PAC and BHVC have reported paying TSG for an assortment of other services, including texting, data, digital and media consulting, signs, printing, and food and beverage.¹⁶
12. According to a review of business registration records from across the country, however, the only active, legally registered entity named “Texas Strategy Group” is a Texas-based lobbying firm that does not appear to offer any of the services listed on the Herrera campaign’s FEC reports.¹⁷ An online search also yields no results for an entity named “Texas Strategy Group” that provides media or political consulting services.
13. The Herrera committees’ FEC reports list two addresses for TSG: (1) 499 South Capital St. #405, Washington, DC 20003; and, in one instance, (2) 502 6th St., Hudson, WI 54016.¹⁸ Both addresses are associated with the committees’ treasurer, Thomas Datwyler.¹⁹ Datwyler used the DC address in connection with a federal campaign

[+strategy+group&two_year_transaction_period=2026](#) (last visited May 20, 2026); *Because Real Americans Never Doubt Our Nation Financial Summary*, FEC, <https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00916825/?tab=summary> (last visited May 20, 2026).

¹⁵ See *Brandon Herrera Victory Committee, Disbursements*, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C00850925&two_year_transaction_period=2024&two_year_transaction_period=2026 (last visited May 20, 2026) (sorting for TSG disbursements for the numerator and excluding transfers from the denominator).

¹⁶ See *Disbursements (Texas Strategy Group)*, *supra* note 11.

¹⁷ See *Entity Search: Texas Strategy Group*, OpenCorporates, https://opencorporates.com/companies?utf8=%E2%9C%93&utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=texas+strategy+group&jurisdiction_code=&type=companies (last visited May 14, 2026); Texas Strategy Group, <https://txstrategy.com/about> (last visited May 14, 2026) (listing Chris Shields—whose names appear on the OpenCorporates registration record—as the firm’s principal).

¹⁸ See *Disbursements (Texas Strategy Group)*, *supra* note 11.

¹⁹ See BRANDON PAC, Statement of Org. at 1; BASED PAC, Amend. Statement of Org. at 1; Brandon Herrera Victory Committee, Amend. Statement of Org. at 1.

contribution,²⁰ and he used the Wisconsin address for both a federal campaign contribution and a filing with the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission naming him the chairperson of a state political committee.²¹ Additionally, TSG’s Wisconsin address is the same address that BRANDON PAC listed on its statement of organization.²²

SUMMARY OF THE LAW

14. Under FECA, if the Commission receives a complaint and determines that there is “reason to believe that a person has committed . . . a violation” of the Act, the Commission “shall make an investigation of such alleged violation.”²³ The reason-to-believe finding is a threshold determination and “does not establish that the law has been violated.”²⁴ The Commission uses the ensuing investigation “to determine whether a violation in fact occurred and, if so, its exact scope.”²⁵ Accordingly, the Commission will find reason to believe when the “available evidence” is “sufficient to warrant conducting

²⁰ Illinois Republican Party – Federal, 2021 July Monthly Report at 6 (Aug. 20, 2021), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/896/202108209466445896/202108209466445896.pdf#navpanes=0>.

²¹ Invest in Our Future PAC, Statement of Org., Kansas Gov. Ethics Comm’n (Aug. 28, 2023), <https://www.kansas.gov/ethics/CFAScanned/PACs/2024ElecCycle/SO/PAC031SO.pdf>; Republican Party of Minnesota – Federal, 2025 Year-End Report at 21 (Jan. 31, 2026), <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/031/202601319808486031/202601319808486031.pdf#navpanes=0>.

²² See BRANDON PAC, Statement of Org. at 1.

²³ 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2); see 11 C.F.R. § 111.10(a).

²⁴ Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 89 Fed. Reg. 19,729, 19,730 (Mar. 20, 2024), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/fedreg_notice_2024-08.pdf.

²⁵ *Id.*

an investigation, and where the seriousness of the alleged violation warrants” further action.²⁶

Disbursement Reporting

15. FECA requires each treasurer of a political committee to file regular reports of receipts and disbursements with the Commission.²⁷ Each report must provide, *inter alia*, information regarding the name and address of each person to whom the committee makes a disbursement aggregating more than \$200 per calendar year, as well as the date, amount, and purpose of such payments.²⁸
16. A committee’s failure to itemize its disbursements leaves voters in the dark about the entities working for the committee, including the nature of and charges for the services provided, as well as the overall amount these entities are being paid—which denies voters their informational interest in knowing “where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent,”²⁹ and undermines the bedrock transparency necessary for voters to meaningfully evaluate candidates and “make informed decisions.”³⁰ Failure to completely and accurately report disbursements also undermines compliance with and enforcement of other laws that protect voters and our electoral system, such as the personal use prohibition and the prohibition on coordination between campaigns and outside spending groups—*e.g.*, super PACs and “dark money” 501(c)(4) groups—through common vendors or former employees.³¹

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 104.1(a).

²⁸ 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(a); 11 C.F.R. § 104.9(a)–(b).

²⁹ *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).

³⁰ *Citizens United v. FEC*, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).

³¹ *See* 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20, 109.21(d)(4), (5).

Reporting Sub-Vendors

17. In Advisory Opinion 1983-25 (Mondale), the Commission determined that a committee need not separately itemize its media vendor’s “payments to other persons, which are made to purchase services or products used in performance of [the vendor’s] contract with the Committee,” *i.e.*, sub-vendor payments.³² The Commission’s conclusion turned on several factors about the relationship between the committee and the vendor, including that: (1) the vendor “has a legal existence that is separate and distinct from the operations of the [c]ommittee;” (2) the vendor’s “principals do not hold any staff position with the [c]ommittee;” (3) the committee and vendor conducted “arms-length negotiations” for the contract to provide services; and (4) the vendor would “not be required to devote its ‘full efforts’ to [the committee] and indeed expects to have other [clients].”³³
18. The Commission has clarified and cabined Advisory Opinion 1983-25 in subsequent enforcement matters, finding that a committee must itemize payments to a sub-vendor when the vendor does not have an “arm’s-length” relationship with the committee, when the payments to the sub-vendor are unrelated to the services provided pursuant to the vendor’s contract with the committee, and/or when the immediate vendor is merely acting as a “conduit” for disbursements to one or more sub-vendors.³⁴
19. In MUR 3874 (Stockman), the Commission found probable cause to believe that Friends of Steve Stockman violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(a) by failing to itemize disbursements to sub-vendors paid through a vendor, Political Won Stop (“PWS”).³⁵

³² Advisory Op. 1983-25 (Mondale) at 2, <https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/1983-25/1983-25.pdf>.

³³ *Id.* at 3.

³⁴ *See infra* ¶¶ 19–21.

³⁵ Conciliation Agreement ¶ V.3, MUR 3874 (Stockman) (Jun. 2, 1998), <https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/3847.pdf> (PDF p. 1583).

PWS was started by a Stockman campaign official and payments from the campaign to PWS were “used to pay, inter alia, . . . third-party vendors to carry out services for the campaign.”³⁶ The Commission concluded that the campaign and PWS did not have “sufficiently separate and distinct identities to warrant the less detailed type of reporting permitted by the Commission in Advisory Opinion 1983-25,”³⁷ particularly because the campaign and PWS were not “conducting their professional relationship at arm’s length,” since one of PWS’s two principals held a position with the campaign and publicly represented himself as a campaign official, and since PWS was devoted largely to the Stockman campaign, working out of its headquarters and using its facilities.³⁸

20. In MUR 4872 (Jenkins), the Commission conciliated knowing and willful violations of FECA’s itemized disbursement disclosure requirement.³⁹ The violations resulted from a scheme in which candidate Louis E. “Woody” Jenkins and his campaign committee, Jenkins for Senate 1996, made payments through the campaign’s primary media vendor, Courtney Communications, to a different vendor, Impact Mail & Printing—which the campaign hired to perform computerized phone bank services—while disclosing only Courtney Communications as the recipient of these payments on its disclosure reports.⁴⁰ Jenkins admitted that he directed the payments to Impact Mail be made through Courtney Communications to avoid public disclosure of his campaign’s association with Impact

³⁶ Gen. Counsel’s Brief at 32–33, MUR 3847 (Stockman) (Sep. 15, 1997) (PDF pp. 1447-48).

³⁷ First Gen. Counsel’s Report at 4, MUR 3874 (Stockman) (Jul. 10, 1991) (PDF p. 654).

³⁸ *See id.* at 5 (PDF p. 655); Gen. Counsel’s Brief at 34–35, MUR 3874 (Stockman) (PDF pp. 1449-50).

³⁹ Conciliation Agreement ¶ V, MUR 4872 (Jenkins for Senate 1996, *et al.*) (Feb. 15, 2002), <https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/4872/0000016F.pdf>.

⁴⁰ *Id.* ¶¶ IV.4–IV.7.

Mail, which was connected to the well-known white supremacist David Duke.⁴¹ The Commission’s conciliation agreement also noted that “Impact Mail was not an ‘ultimate vendor’ or sub vendor of Courtney Communications” because “Courtney had no involvement whatsoever with the services provided by Impact Mail[,] . . . [and, indeed,] Courtney’s only role in this matter was to serve as a conduit for payment to Impact Mail so as to conceal the transaction with Impact Mail.”⁴²

21. In MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President), the Commission found reason to believe that Michelle Bachmann’s campaign committee unlawfully failed to disclose payments to Iowa State Senator Kent Sorenson, ultimately conciliating the violations.⁴³ Sorenson and the campaign believed that state law prohibited Sorenson from accepting payments in exchange for supporting Bachmann, so the campaign routed the money through C&M Strategies, Inc. (“C&M”), one of its vendors, to conceal the transactions.⁴⁴ Finding that Sorenson “did not take direction from or perform any work for C&M,” and C&M did not exercise any control over the funds that were earmarked for Sorenson, the Commission concluded that Sorenson could not be classified as C&M’s sub-vendor.⁴⁵ Therefore, Sorenson should have been disclosed as the ultimate payee.⁴⁶ The Office of General Counsel also noted in its analysis that: (1) C&M’s only principal held an official position

⁴¹ *Id.* ¶ IV.7 (“Jenkins acknowledges that Impact Mail provided the services to the Jenkins Committee . . . [and that] Jenkins decided to make disbursements for the services through Courtney Communications because he did not want his campaign to be associated with Impact Mail and did not want Impact Mail listed on the Jenkins Committee’s disclosure reports.”).

⁴² *Id.* ¶ IV.9.

⁴³ See Conciliation Agreement ¶ V, MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President), <https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6724/17044423200.pdf> (July 27, 2017).

⁴⁴ *Id.* ¶ IV.3.

⁴⁵ *Id.* ¶¶ IV.4–IV.5.

⁴⁶ *Id.* ¶ V; see also Factual and Legal Analysis at 8–10, MUR 6800 (Ron Paul 2012 Presidential Campaign Comm., Inc.) (Jun. 30, 2016), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6800/6800_18.pdf (finding reason to believe that Ron Paul’s presidential campaign committee knowingly and willfully violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(a) by paying Iowa State Senator Kent Sorenson for his endorsement using a vendor as an intermediary to disguise the payments).

with the campaign and worked out of the campaign headquarters; (2) C&M dedicated all its resources to Bachmann’s campaign and leadership committee; and (3) given those factors, there did not appear to be an arm’s length relationship between the campaign and C&M—meaning that C&M was not the ultimate payee under the Mondale factors.⁴⁷

CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT I:

**BRANDON HERRERA, BRANDON HERRERA FOR CONGRESS, BRANDON PAC,
AND THE BRENDAN HERRERA VICTORY COMMITTEE HAVE VIOLATED
52 U.S.C. § 30104(B)(5)(A) BY FAILING TO REPORT THE ULTIMATE PAYEES OF THEIR
EXPENDITURES ATTRIBUTED TO TEXAS STRATEGY GROUP**

22. Applying the three factors that the Commission outlined in Advisory Opinion 1983-25 (Mondale) and explicated in subsequent matters, there is reason to believe Herrera and his campaign committee, leadership PAC, and joint fundraising committee violated FECA by reporting payments to TSG without itemizing TSG’s payments to sub-vendors, who were the ultimate recipients of the committees’ funds. TSG is not a “separate and distinct” entity operating at arm’s length from the Herrera committees, and it appears to have “devote[d] its ‘full efforts’ to” Herrera’s political operation.⁴⁸ Accordingly, there is

⁴⁷ See First Gen. Counsel’s Report at 14–16, MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President) (Aug. 26, 2014), <https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6724/17044423059.pdf>. Notwithstanding these precedents, three commissioners voted to dismiss a sub-vendor reporting complaint in MUR 7784, based, among other reasons, on the legally flawed view that sub-vendor reporting is required only where the “immediate recipient [of funds] is merely a conduit for the intended recipient of the funds.” Statement of Reasons of Chairman Allen J. Dickerson & Comm’rs Sean J. Cooksey & James E. “Trey” Trainor at 5, MUR 7784 (MAGA PAC) (Jun. 9, 2022), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7784/7784_42.pdf (quoting MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President)). The three commissioners also errantly claimed that Campaign Legal Center’s pending rulemaking petition—which seeks to expand the sub-vendor reporting requirement to cover situations *not already covered* by the existing rule—indicated an “uncertain” “regulatory environment” regarding the reporting of ultimate payees. See *id.* at 12; see also *FEC Rulemaking Petition on Transparency for Political Spending*, CLC (Jun. 29, 2021), <https://campaignlegal.org/document/fec-rulemaking-petition-transparency-political-spending>. The Commission’s dismissal of MUR 7784 is the subject of ongoing litigation. See *Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC*, No. 22-5339 (D.C. Cir.) (appeal filed Dec. 21, 2022).

⁴⁸ See Advisory Op. 1983-25 at 3.

reason to believe Herrera, Brandon Herrera for Congress, BRANDON PAC, and BHVC violated FECA by failing to itemize sub-vendor payments made through TSG.

23. The available facts strongly indicate that TSG is not a separate and distinct entity from Herrera’s committees. TSG is not a registered business *anywhere* in the United States,⁴⁹ so it does not have “a legal existence,” much less one “that is separate and distinct from the operations of the [c]ommittee.”⁵⁰ Even assuming *arguendo* that TSG genuinely exists—*i.e.*, that it is a legally registered entity in at least one U.S. jurisdiction—it is also linked to Herrera’s political operation: one of the addresses Herrera ascribed to TSG on an FEC report is BRANDON PAC’s address in Wisconsin.⁵¹ It therefore appears that TSG is an integrated arm of the Herrera political operation, rather than an independent commercial entity.⁵²
24. The fact that both of TSG’s reported addresses—in Hudson, WI and Washington, DC—are linked to Thomas Datwyler, the Herrera committees’ treasurer, indicates that Datwyler is also an agent of TSG, meaning TSG and each of the Herrera committees have at least one overlapping agent.⁵³ This further underscores the point that TSG is not separate and distinct from Herrera’s political operation, but is instead a mere shell entity established to serve as a payment clearinghouse for the committees to conceal who they are actually paying to provide goods and/or services.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ See *supra* ¶ 12.

⁵⁰ See Advisory Op. 1983-25 at 3.

⁵¹ See *supra* ¶ 13.

⁵² See MUR 3874 (Stockman) (requiring sub-vendor reporting when the vendor used the campaign’s office as its headquarters).

⁵³ See *supra* ¶ 13.

⁵⁴ See Advisory Op. 1983-25 at 3; MUR 3874 (Stockman).

25. Indeed, because Datwyler is affiliated with the Herrera committees *and* TSG, the Herrera committees have each paid TSG at least 87% of their operating expenses (with Herrera’s 2026 campaign committee paying an inconceivable 99.5% of its expenditures to TSG), and Herrera’s committees appear to supply all of TSG’s revenue, the two sides—Herrera’s committees and TSG—could not reasonably have negotiated an arm’s length business relationship.⁵⁵ TSG is simply too intertwined and dependent on this network of Herrera-affiliated political committees to negotiate at arm’s length.⁵⁶
26. The sheer variety of services that TSG purportedly provided to Herrera’s committees also indicates that TSG is being used as a shell entity to conceal the true vendors. The Herrera campaign reported paying TSG over \$1.2 million this cycle alone for consulting, advertising, compliance, caging, “database,” and bank fees, and Herrera’s other committees paid it for assorted additional expenses like texting, printing, and food and beverage.⁵⁷ These are distinct and specialized services that are not typically performed by a single commercial vendor—let alone an unregistered business entity that has only one client.⁵⁸
27. Finally, the record is clear that TSG is dedicating its full resources to Herrera’s operation. As a “business,” TSG has no identifiable clients outside of a set of Herrera-affiliated committees—his campaign, leadership PACs, and joint fundraising committee—and it does not appear to be looking to add more: TSG does not appear to maintain a website or have any online presence, advertise its services, or provide publicly available contact

⁵⁵ See *supra* ¶¶ 5–11, 13.

⁵⁶ See Advisory Op. 1983-25 at 3.

⁵⁷ See *supra* ¶ 8, 11.

⁵⁸ See MUR 4872 (Jenkins) (requiring sub-vendor reporting when the vendor was not enlisting sub-vendors to help with its own work).

information.⁵⁹ Indeed, it is deeply concerning that TSG does not even appear to be legally registered to do business anywhere in the country.⁶⁰ TSG is plainly functioning as an extension of Herrera’s electoral efforts, not as a bona fide commercial vendor seeking to draw other clients from the public.⁶¹ It therefore appears that TSG was set up to serve as nothing more than a straw middleman between Herrera’s political operation and the vendors actually being paid to provide the reported services—an unlawful setup that grossly undermines electoral transparency.

28. Viewed as a whole, therefore, the available information supports finding reason to believe the Herrera committees and TSG do not have “sufficiently separate and distinct identities to warrant the less detailed type of reporting permitted by the Commission in Advisory Opinion 1983-25.”⁶² Indeed, there is reason to believe TSG exists only on paper and serves as a mere payment clearinghouse for Herrera’s committees to conceal the identities of their vendors. Furthermore, given the committees’ near-total reliance on TSG for all of their operations, there is reason to believe Herrera—the principal each committee serves—knew about or was involved in setting up this opaque, unlawful arrangement.
29. Accordingly, there is reason to believe Herrera, Brandon Herrera for Congress, BRANDON PAC, and BHVC violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(a) by failing to report the ultimate payees of their disbursements attributed to TSG, thereby denying the public

⁵⁹ See *supra* ¶¶ 10, 12.

⁶⁰ See *supra* ¶ 12.

⁶¹ See Advisory Op. 1983-25 at 3 (indicating that the existence of multiple clients is a factor related to a vendor’s legitimacy); see also MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President) (requiring sub-vendor reporting when the primary vendor was servicing only Bachmann’s campaign and leadership PAC).

⁶² First Gen. Counsel’s Report at 4, MUR 3874 (Stockman); see also MUR 6724 (Bachmann for President); MUR 6800 (Ron Paul 2012 Presidential Campaign Comm., Inc.).

important information about how money is being spent to influence their votes. Voters have a right to know who Herrera's committees are actually paying to provide services; indeed, the Commission must act to provide voters with this essential information so that they can cast informed ballots in the 2026 election.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

30. Wherefore, the Commission should find reason to believe that Brandon Herrera, Brandon Herrera for Congress, BRANDON PAC, BHVC, and Thomas Datwyler in his official capacity as treasurer for each of these committees violated 52 U.S.C. § 30101 *et seq.*, and conduct an immediate investigation under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2).
31. Further, the Commission should seek appropriate sanctions for any and all violations, including civil penalties sufficient to deter future violations and an injunction prohibiting the respondents from any and all violations in the future, and should seek such additional remedies as are necessary and appropriate to ensure compliance with FECA.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Saurav Ghosh
Campaign Legal Center, by
Saurav Ghosh, Esq.
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-2200

/s/ Roger Wieand
Roger Wieand
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-2200

Saurav Ghosh, Esq.
Campaign Legal Center
1101 14th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
Counsel to the Campaign Legal Center,
Roger Wieand

May 21, 2026

VERIFICATION

The complainants listed below hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Complaint are, upon their information and belief, true.

Sworn pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

For Complainant Roger Wieand




Roger Wieand

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21st day of May 2026.



Notary Public



Notarized remotely using audio-video communication technology via Proof.

VERIFICATION

The complainants listed below hereby verify that the statements made in the attached Complaint are, upon their information and belief, true.

Sworn pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

For Complainant Campaign Legal Center

Saurav Ghosh


Saurav Ghosh, Esq.

State of Pennsylvania, County of Beaver

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 21st day of May 2026.

Michael J Webb

Notary Public



Notarized remotely online using communication technology via Proof.