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1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON	
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING	
3	VOTERS EDUCATION )	
4	COMMITTEE, ET AL., )	
5	PLAINTIFFS, ) CAUSE NO.	
6	VS. ) 04-2-23351-1 SEA	
7	PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ) 04-2-03247-8 SEA COMMISSION, ET AL., )	
8	DEFENDANTS. )	
9	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS	
10		
11	HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES	
12		
13	AUGUST 12, 2005	
14	APPEARANCES:	
15	JOHN WHITE, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW ADDEADING OF THE	
16	PLAINTIFFS;	
17	LINDA DALTON, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE	
18	DEFENDANTS;	
19	MICHAEL E. WITHEY, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENOR;	
20	THE INTERVENOR;	
21		
22	WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD AND DONE,	
23	TO-WIT:	
24	ORDERED BY: LINDA DALTON	
25	REPORTED BY LADD A. SUTHERLAND, RPR, CSR, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER	
	No.	

FRIDAY, AUGUST 12, 2005; 11:03 AM
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THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, AGAIN. PLEASE BE SEATED. 3

FIRST OF ALL I WANTED TO THANK ALL OF THE COUNSEL IN 5 THIS CASE FOR THE ADVOCACY AND THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU 6 REPRESENTED YOUR CLIENTS AND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL THAT YOU PROVIDED TO THE COURT. THE BRIEFING AND MATERIALS 7 SUBMITTED WERE VERY INSTRUMENTAL AND HELPFUL TO THE COURT 8 IN REACHING THE DETERMINATION THAT I HAVE MADE. I ALSO 9 10 DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU RELATED TO EACH

> THE FOLLOWING RULING APPLIES TO BOTH MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION.

AT THE OUTSET THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE FOCUS OF THESE MOTIONS PERTAINED TO TWO TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS CONCERNING FORMER INSURANCE COMMISSIONER DEBORAH SENN. AT THE TIME OF THESE ADS MS. SENN WAS A CANDIDATE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL. THE STATEMENTS IN THE ADS INCLUDE REFERENCES TO PRESS COVERAGE OF MS, SENN AS INSURANCE COMMISSIONER. THERE IS NO FACT DISPUTE REGARDING THE CONTENT OF THE ADVERTISEMENT. HENCE THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THE SOLE DETERMINATION CONCERNS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. SUCH CONSTRUCTION IS A QUESTION OF LAW THAT MAY BE RESOLVED BY THE COURT AT THIS TIME.

MS. SENN'S COUNSEL HAS CONCEDED DURING ARGUMENT THAT

OTHER, AS WELL, COUNSEL.

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1	THERE IS NO CR 56 MOTION OUTSTANDING, AND THAT THIS MATTER
2	IS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION, DESPITE THE REPRESENTATIONS IN HIS
3	BRIEFING.
4	THE ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT ARE WHETHER THE VEC HAD
5	A DUTY TO REGISTER AS A POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND FILE
6	REPORTS TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC INFORMATION REQUIRED BY
7	STATUTE.
8	IN REACHING ITS CONCLUSIONS THIS COURT WISHES TO MAKE
9	A FORMAL RECORD OF ITS ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABLE AND
10	CONTROLLING LEGAL AUTHORITIES.
11	THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT BUCKLEY VS. VALEJO WAS
12	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL ON POLITICAL
13	SPEECH PRIOR TO 2003. BUCKLEY CLEARLY PROVIDED A
14	DISTINCTION FOR PURPOSES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING BETWEEN
15	ADVOCACY THAT WAS EXPRESS THAT IS, ADVOCATED FOR THE
16	ELECTION OR DEFEAT OF THE CANDIDATE AND THAT RELATED SOLELY
17	TO ISSUE STATEMENTS. THE SUPREME COURT CLEARLY CONCLUDED
18	IN BUCKLEY THAT THE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF
19	THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN LAWS APPLIED ONLY TO EXPRESS ADVOCACY
20	FOR THE ELECTION OR DEFEAT OF A CLEARLY IDENTIFIED
21	CANDIDATE FOR FEDERAL OFFICE.
22	THE COURT IN BUCKLEY ATTEMPTED TO GET TO THE

THE COURT IN BUCKLEY ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY EXPRESS ADVOCACY BY GIVING EXAMPLES OF LANGUAGE AND TERMS THAT HAVE SINCE BECOME KNOWN AS THE "MAGIC WORDS." OUR OWN STATE SUPREME COURT HAS FURTHER DEFINED EXPRESS ADVOCACY IN THE

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WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY DECISION, WSRP,
HEREINAFTER TO INCLUDE STATEMENTS THAT EXHORT A LISTENER TO
VOTE EITHER FOR OR AGAINST A PARTICULAR CANDIDATE. THE
BUCKLEY AND WASHINGTON STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY DECISIONS
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SPEECH THAT LACKS A SPECIFIC EXHORTATION
TO VOTE IN A PARTICULAR WAY IS TO BE IDENTIFIED AS ISSUE
ADVOCACY AND BEYOND THE REACH OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND
FULLY PROTECTED AS POLITICAL SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.
IN 2003 IN MCCONNELL, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S MOST RECENT ANALYSIS OF THESE STATUTES CHANGED THE
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPRESS AND
ISSUE ADVOCACY. IN THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT IN MCCONNELL OVERTURNED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION
OF BUCKLEY AS RELIED UPON BY OUR STATE SUPREME COURT IN
WSRP, AND RENDERED A DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXPRESS AND ISSUE
ADVOCACY AS THE DECISION INDICATED, "FUNCTIONALLY
MEANINGLESS." THE SO-CALLED "MAGIC WORDS" NO LONGER
CONTROLLED IN THE ANALYSIS.
CONSEQUENTLY IN THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN EXPRESS OR ISSUE ADVOCACY IS NO LONGER THE

CONTROLLING LAW. WHILE THE COURT IS SATISFIED THAT THIS IS A CORRECT CONCLUSION, THERE ARE NONETHELESS CASES AND DECISIONS CONTINUING TO ANALYZE EXPRESS VERSUS ISSUE ADVOCACY, AS HAD BEEN DONE PRIOR TO 2003, ANDERSON VS.

L	SPEARS,	TO	NAME	ONE
L	SPEARS,	TO	NAME	ON:

EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO CONCLUDE THE DISTINCTION
STILL EXISTED, THE COURT WOULD NONETHELESS HOLD AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE AD REGARDING SENN IS CLEARLY EXPRESS
ADVOCACY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF WSRP, WHICH CLEARLY HELD
THAT STATE RESTRICTIONS FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS CAN BE
APPLIED. WSRP INCLUDED IN ITS DEFINITION OF EXPRESS
ADVOCACY IF IN THAT AD THE CANDIDATE'S CHARACTER AND
CAMPAIGN TACTICS ARE ATTACKED, THE AD MAY BE SUBJECT TO
ONLY ONE REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AND EXHORTATION: TO
VOTE AGAINST A CANDIDATE.

WSRP ALSO DEFINED ISSUE ADVOCACY AS ADVOCACY THAT INTENDS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT PARTICULAR ISSUES GERMANE TO AN ELECTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE THERE WERE TWO ADVERTISEMENTS OF MS. SENN'S RECORD AS AN INSURANCE COMMISSIONER. THE FIRST AD IS ISSUE ADVOCACY BEYOND THE REACH OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT. THE SECOND GENERALLY FITS IN THE SAME CATEGORY EXCEPT FOR ONE LINE WHICH CLEARLY TRANSITIONS THE SCOPE OF THE AD FROM ISSUE TO EXPRESS ADVOCACY. THAT BEING, "SENN EVEN TRIED TO COVER UP THE DEAL FROM STATE LEGISLATORS."

UNDER ANY NOTION OF RATIONAL INTERPRETATION THE SUGGESTION THAT AN ELECTED OFFICIAL ENGAGED IN A "COVER UP" IS AN ASSERTION THAT CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY SUGGESTS THE OFFICIAL ENGAGED IN AN ACT OF DECEIT, DECEPTION, FRAUD OR

L,	CONCEALMENT.

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2	UNDER THE WORDS QUOTED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN
3	MCCONNELL IN FOOTNOTE 78, THE NOTION THAT THIS
4	ADVERTISEMENT WAS DESIGNED PURELY TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES AND
5	NOTED A PERSONAL ATTACK ON THE CHARACTER STRAINS CREDULITY.
6	ANY LISTENER KNOWING OF THE CITIZEN'S CANDIDACY FOR
7	ATTORNEY GENERAL WOULD HAVE ONLY ONE REASONABLE
8	INTERPRETATION: THAT IS, THAT THE AD WAS AN EXHORTATION TO
9	VOTE AGAINST SENN. IT IS CLEAR TO THIS COURT THAT AN
10	ASSERTION THAT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WAS INVOLVED IN A COVER-UP
11	IS NOT A DISCUSSION OF ISSUES; IT IS A CLEAR ATTACK ON THE
12	CHARACTER OF THE CANDIDATE.
13	IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION THE COURT AGREES WITH
14	VEC THAT A MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS TO
15	PROTECT THE FREE DISCUSSION OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
16	INCLUDING THE DISCUSSION OF CANDIDATES. HOWEVER, WHEN THE
17	NATURE, SCOPE AND BREADTH, AS IN THIS CASE, EXCEEDS
18	CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS, IT CANNOT BE SANCTIONED BY THE
19	COURT.
20	IN THIS ANALYSIS THE COURT ALSO REJECTED VEC'S
21	ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 ARGUMENT. VEC'S GUNWELL ANALYSIS IS
22	FLAWED. THIS COURT HOLDS THAT AFTER REVIEWING THE ANALYSIS
23	OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES, ANY ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS
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25	SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE VOTERS' RIGHT TO INFORMATION REGARDING POLITICAL ACTIVITY, NOT THE RIGHT OF VEC TO

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1	RESTRICT	DISCLOSURE	OF	THE	INFORMATION.
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THE FINAL GUNWELL FACTOR, THAT IS "MANAGED WITH
PARTICULAR STATE INTEREST OR LOCAL CONCERN" IS A MATTER OF
PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THIS COURT'S CONCLUSION AND
ANALYSIS. THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE PARTIES PERSONALLY,
THE HISTORY, THE CURRENT STATEMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL
LAW, INDICATES THAT THE GROWING TREND IN THIS COUNTRY IS TO
PROVIDE GREATER PROTECTION FOR THE LISTENING PUBLIC ON THE
FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS.

IN THIS REGARD IF THERE IS TO BE GREATER PROTECTION, WASHINGTON PRECEDENT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT IT IS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC. MOREOVER, WHILE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR SUPPORT OF AUTHORITY OF WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ADDRESSING THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 5, IT WOULD APPEAR A FAIR READING SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR WASHINGTON VOTERS TO RECEIVE INFORMATION IN THE ELECTION PROCESS THAN TO RESTRICT IT.

VEC HAS ALSO ALLEGED THAT REQUIRING THEM TO REGISTER AND DISCLOSE CONSTITUTES A PRIOR RESTRAINT. THIS CLAIM IS NOT SUPPORTED IN LAW OR IN FACT. THE PDC DEMAND TO REGISTRATION IS NOT BEING DONE TO REGULATE THE CONDUCT OF THE VEC AND/OR PROHIBIT ANY EXPRESSION OF SPEECH. THE CLEAR STATUTORY PURPOSE OF THE REGULATION IS THE IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE WHO SPONSORED THE SPEECH. THIS

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1	ACTIVITY DOES NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A PRIOR
2	RESTRAINT.
3	LAST VEC SEEKS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER 42 USC,
4	SECTION 8, 1983. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED.
5	VEC HAS FAILED IN ALL RESPECTS TO PROVE ANY ELEMENT OF A
6	1983 CLAIM.
7	FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS THE PDC'S MOTION FOR
8	SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. VEC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
9	JUDGMENT IS DENIED. AND INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO COMPEL
10	ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IS DENIED BASED ON COUNSEL'S
11	CONCESSIONS IN ORAL ARGUMENT.
12	THIS IS THE COURT'S RULING IN THIS MATTER.
13	COUNSEL, DO YOU HAVE AN ORDER AVAILABLE FOR THE COURT
14	AT THIS TIME?
15	MS. DALTON: NOT AT THIS TIME.
16	THE COURT: I'LL GIVE YOU A DATE AND TIME FOR FORMAL
17	PRESENTMENT TO THE COURT. IF THE PARTIES ARE IN AGREEMENT
18	AS TO THE LANGUAGE, YOU CAN SUBMIT THE ORDER TO THE COURT
19	EX PARTE WITHOUT PRESENTATION. IF THERE'S ANY ISSUE OF
20	LANGUAGE TO BE INCLUDED, THE COURT'S BAILIFF AT THIS TIME
21	WILL GIVE YOU A DATE AND TIME FOR FORMAL PRESENTMENT.
22	COUNSEL, HOW MUCH TIME WILL THE PARTIES NEED FOR
23	FORMAL PRESENTMENT?
24	MR. WHITE: TWO WEEKS.

KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

MS. DALTON: TWO WEEKS, YES.

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1	THE BAILIFF: SETTING IT AS A MORNING MATTER, JUDGE?
2	THE COURT: COUNSEL, DO YOU THINK YOU'LL NEED MORE
3	THAN 15 MINUTES OR SO FOR PRESENTMENT?
4	MS. DALTON: NO. I THINK WE'LL AGREE TO THE TERMS OF
5	THE ORDER AS IS.
6	THE COURT: WE'LL SET IT AS A MORNING MATTER. AND,
7	COUNSEL, IF ALL PARTIES SIGN OFF ON THE ORDER, PLEASE
8	CONTACT THE BAILIFF, AND THE HEARING DATE WE'RE ABOUT TO
9	GIVE YOU WILL BE STRICKEN, AND NO PARTY NEEDS TO APPEAR.
10	THE BAILIFF: TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6TH AT 8:45 AM.
11	THE COURT: COUNSEL, IF THERE'S A POINT OF
12	CLARIFICATION IN WHATEVER ORDER THAT YOU'RE PREPARING, I'LL
13	GIVE YOU TWO ALTERNATIVES. THE FIRST IS IF THERE'S NO
14	OBJECTION, YOU CAN CONTACT THIS COURT, AND WE CAN SET UP A
15	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE TO MINIMIZE THE PARTIES HAVING TO COME
16	BACK TO THE COURT FOR CLARIFICATION. IF YOU WISH TO HAVE
17	THE ISSUES AND QUESTIONS A MATTER OF FORMAL RECORD, WE CAN
18	ALSO DO THAT IN COURT ON THE DATE OF THE FORMAL
19	PRESENTATION. I'M JUST TRYING TO MAKE IT EASIER ON THE
20	PARTIES, WHICHEVER WAY YOU WANTED TO DO IT. I'LL GIVE YOU
21	A DATE FOR FORMAL PRESENTMENT.
22	WE'LL BE IN RECESS.
23	(WHEREUPON THE HEARING IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER
24	CONCLUDED AT 11:17 AM.)
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