The amicus brief on behalf of former Directors of the U.S. Census Bureau, produced in conjunction with the Campaign Legal Center.

The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision reflects a fundamental and indefensible misunderstanding of this Court’s precedents on redistricting. If allowed to stand, the decision would encourage states to eliminate coalition districts—districts in which white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the minority’s preferred candidate—and replace them with unjustifiably race-driven districts, all with the purported aim of ensuring compliance with the VRA. This result turns the VRA on its head and runs afoul of the clear dictates of the Equal Protection Clause. It should be reversed. 

Supplemental comments submitted jointly by the Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 in response to questions posed by Commissioner McGahn to Paul S. Ryan of the Campaign Legal Center at the Commission’s March 3 rulemaking hearing regarding coordinated communications under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21

Letter sent to the U.S. Census Bureau from 34 organizations, including the Campaign Legal Center. The organizations urge the Bureau to count incarcerated people at their home address, rather than at the particular facility that they happen to be located at on Census day.

Presentation on redistricting given by Gerry Hebert at the 31st COGEL Annual Conference in Scottsdale, Arizona.

A bill to prohibit States from carrying out more than one Congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, to require States to conduct such redistricting through independent commissions, and for other purposes.

A bill to establish the terms and conditions States must follow in carrying out Congressional redistricting.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 2006 (hereinafter “Section 5”). Complaint ¶¶ 1-7, 11-37. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(b), 2284 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a), as well as the Court’s Local Rule 9.1, Plaintiffs apply for a three-judge court to adjudicate this action. In support of this application, Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities.

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter a judgment for the Plaintiffs (1) declaring that Section 5 unconstitutionally exceeds Congressional authority; (2) declaring that the Section 5, as amended in 2006, violates the Fifth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, particularly as applied by the Attorney General, both generally and in his specific refusal to permit Kinston’s change to nonpartisan elections; (3) enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing Section 5 against Kinston’s change to nonpartisan elections; (4) enjoining any enforcement of Section 5 against Kinston in the future; and (5) any other relief the Court deems just and proper. 

The Defendant requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

Defendant asks Court to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims and, moreover, that Plaintiffs' claims are not authorized by Section 5, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

Defendant, Attorney General of the United States (“United States”), opposes the Plaintiffs’ Application for a Three-Judge Court. Because Congress has not authorized three-judge courts to hear the constitutional claims in this case, the Plaintiffs’ application should be denied. 

Intervenors-Appellees request that the Court affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant-intervenors’ motion to dismiss should be denied.

Intervenors-Appellees respectfully request that the Court affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Defendant reply in support of Motion for Sanctions. It is argued that the city and its attorneys came nowhere close to showing that the cross-appeal was non-frivolous and filed in good faith. Nor have they convincingly argued that Plaintiffs’ counsel seek an unreasonable amount of attorneys’ fees. The Court should therefore sanction the city and its attorneys under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and order them to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel the full amount requested.

Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellees Phillip Patrick Baca, Mary Molina Mescall, Bernadette Miera and Ron Romero (collectively the “Plaintiffs”) hereby move for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in the amount of $66,980.651 against both the City of Albuquerque 2 and its attorneys, Luis G. Stelzner, Jamie L. Dawes, Sara N. Sanchez3 and Patrick J. Rogers. The city and its attorneys filed and pursued a frivolous cross-appeal in bad faith, forcing Plaintiffs to endure months of financial uncertainty and angst, Plaintiffs’ pro bono counsel to expend significant unnecessary time and money, and this Court to waste valuable judicial resources. 

Amicus brief on behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21 in support of Appellant. Amici argue that the Court should hold that the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is not a valid exercise of Congress’s remedial powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. 

Appellants' reply brief. Appellant argues that the Court should reverse the judgment of the district court and render judgment that the district is entitled to use the bailout procedure or, alternatively, that §5 cannot be constitutionally applied to the district.